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Mohammed Abdel Raouf Arafat al-Qudwa Al-Husseini,
more commonly known as Yasser Arafat was the fifth of seven children
born to a Palestinian textile merchant on August 24, 1929. According to
Arafat and other sources, he was born in Jerusalem; however, French
biographers, Christophe Boltanski and Jihan El-Tahri revealed in their
1997 book, Les sept vies de Yasser Arafat, that he was actually born in
Cairo, Egypt, and that is where his birth certificate was registered.
The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs
also lists Arafat’s birthplace as Cairo. Ian Pacepa, a former Romanian
intelligence official, disclosed that the KGB had invented a background
for Arafat with a birthplace in Jerusalem.
Claims that Arafat was related to the Jerusalem
Husseini clan through his mother have been disputed by the Palestinian
historian Said Aburish. In an unauthorized biography, Aburish claims
that “The young Arafat sought to establish his Palestinian credentials
and promote his eventual claim to leadership... [and] could not afford
to admit any facts which might reduce his Palestinian identity. ...Arafat
insistently perpetuated the legend that he had been born in Jerusalem
and was related to the important Husseini clan of that city.”
Arafat’s childhood was divided between Cairo and
Jerusalem, where he lived for four years with an uncle following the
death of his mother when he was five. Arafat entered the University of
King Faud I (later renamed Cairo University) in 1947 and studied
engineering. It was during his college years that Arafat adopted the
name Yasser, which means “easygoing” in Arabic.
During the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Arafat left the
university and, along with other Palestinians, sought to enter Palestine
to fight for Palestinian independence. He was disarmed and turned back
by Egyptian military forces that refused to allow the poorly trained
partisans to enter the war zone. After returning to the university,
Arafat joined the Muslim Brotherhood and served as president of the
Union of Palestinian Students from 1952 to 1956. By 1956, Arafat
graduated with a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering and served as a
second lieutenant in the Egyptian Army during the Suez Crisis.
The PLO
After the Suez War, Arafat moved to Kuwait, where
he found work as an engineer and eventually set up his own contracting
firm. In Kuwait, he also helped found Fatah in 1957, an organization
dedicated to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in
place of Israel and Jordan (i.e., historic Palestine).
Backed by Syria, Fatah began carrying out terrorist
raids against Israeli targets, starting with an unsuccessful attempt to
blow up an Israeli water pump in December 1964. From that point on,
Fatah launched dozens of raids against civilian Israeli targets from
Jordan, Lebanon and Egyptian-occupied Gaza to avoid provoking reprisals
against their Syrian patrons.
When the a coup occurred in Syria in 1966, a new
leader was appointed to head Fatah, but he was murdered. Arafat, who
took the nom de guerre Abu Ammar, was then arrested by the Syrians, but
was subsequently released and fled to Beirut with his inner circle.
Arafat Takes Over
In 1964, the Arab League created the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) as a tool in the war against Israel.
Arafat’s Fatah, which initially viewed the organization as a political
opponent, gradually became the organization’s dominant faction.
Following the humiliating defeat of the Arab forces in the 1967 War; the
PLO decided that it could not rely on the Arab states to achieve its
objective of destroying Israel. For the next ten years, this goal was
the primary focus of the massive terrorist campaign by which the PLO’s
reputation was formed.
Meanwhile, Fatah established a base in the
Jordanian city of Karameh. This was the target of an Israeli assault
planned in reprisal for a terrorist attack against a school bus full of
children that killed two and wounded 28 on March 18, 1968. Three days
later, the Israelis dropped leaflets on Karameh warning of an impending
attack and advising civilians to leave. When the Israeli forces arrived,
they met unexpected resistance from forces of the regular Jordanian army.
In the ensuing battle, from which Arafat fled after distributing weapons,
the Israelis said they suffered 28 dead and 90 wounded, whereas the
Jordanians had 100 dead and 90 wounded, and 170 terrorists had been
killed and 200 captured. The Jordanian account virtually reversed these
figures, claiming 200 Israeli dead compared to only 20 of their soldiers.
The Palestinian version presented an entirely different picture,
claiming their heroic resistance had caused 500 Israeli casualties.
Although its account was dubious, the Arab media
glorified the Palestinian stand against the Israelis at Karameh (much to
the chagrin of the Jordanians who did most of the fighting), and the
effect was to stimulate a wave of volunteers seeking to join the PLO.
The Palestinian terrorists escalated their attacks throughout the year,
with the casualty toll in 1968 alone reaching 177 Israeli dead and 700
wounded, and 681 Palestinians were killed and wounded in attacks and
reprisals.
The “victory” at Karameh allowed Arafat to gain the
prestige he needed to exert greater influence over the PLO. The
Palestinian National Council met in 1968 and revised the Charter,
adopting Fatah's commitment to liberate Palestine by armed struggle
alone. A year later, when the Council met again, Arafat was elected
chairman of the PLO, a position he has held ever since. Over the next
year, Arafat consolidated his power by bringing most of the militant
Palestinian factions under the umbrella of the PLO.
Challenging King Hussein
In the late 1960s, tensions between Palestinians
and the Jordanian government intensified; heavily armed Palestinian
resistance elements (fedayeen) had created a virtual “state within a
state” in Jordan, eventually controlling several strategic positions,
including the oil refinery near Az Zarq. Jordan considered this a
growing threat to its sovereignty and security and attempted to disarm
the Palestinian militias. Open fighting erupted in June of 1970.
The final straw for King Hussein occurred when
Palestinian terrorists flew three hijacked planes to Jordan and blew
them up on September 12, 1970. Four days later, Hussein declared martial
law. That same day, Arafat became commander of the Palestine Liberation
Army (PLA), the regular military force of the PLO. In the ensuing civil
war, the PLO had the active support of Syria, which invaded Jordan with
a force of around 200 tanks. The fighting was mainly between the
Jordanian army and the PLA; the U.S. Navy dispatched the Sixth Fleet to
the eastern Mediterranean and Israel deployed troops to aid Hussein, if
necessary. By September 24, the Jordanian army had defeated the
Palestinian forces. Most of the Palestinian leadership, including Arafat
(who disguised himself as a Kuwaiti official), fled to Syria, and later
Lebanon, where they soon set about undermining the central government of
that country.
The change in location did not effect Arafat’s
commitment to terror. In September 1972, a terrorist arm of Fatah, named
Black September for the debacle in Jordan, murdered 11 Israeli athletes
at the Munich Olympic Games. This attracted international attention for
the Palestinian cause, but also condemnation for the tactics of the PLO.
On March 2, 1973, members of the PLO murdered U.S.
Ambassador to the Sudan Cleo Noel and chargé d'affaires George Moore.
The killers were captured by Sudan and admitted they had received orders
directly from the PLO. U.S. intelligence officials were believed to also
have evidence directly tying Arafat to the killings, but for unknown
reasons suppressed it. All the terrorists were released
Aftermath of the 1973 War
After Arab armies were defeated yet again on the
battlefield in the October 1973 War, Arafat decided it was necessary to
alter his strategy. The PLO remained committed to the liberation of
Palestine through armed struggle, but decided to shift from strictly
terrorist activities to waging a diplomatic war against Israel.
Arafat deftly manipulated the organization from one
perceived by the (Western) public as barbaric into one slowly being
considered a movement with legitimate claims. This new tack was aided by
the all-important recognition of the PLO by the United Nations, which
gave the organization a foothold into the international body’s
deliberations. On November 13, 1974, Arafat made an unprecedented
appearance before the UN, wearing his military uniform with an empty
holster [he was forced to remove his pistol before entering the chamber]
around his waist,. and declared, “Today I have come bearing an olive
branch and a freedom fighter's gun. Do not let the olive branch fall
from my hand.”
Jordan’s claims to represent the Palestinians were
then permanently undercut by the Arab League’s declaration at the Rabat
Conference that the PLO was the sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people. This also enhanced the PLO's standing as a political
movement.
Life in Lebanon
While Arafat adopted an increasingly high profile
diplomatic pose, the PLO continued to employ terror against Israel,
primarily from its new base in southern Lebanon. Because of Lebanon’s
weak central government, the PLO was able to operate virtually as an
independent state (called “Fatahland” by Israel). The PLO helped
destabilize Lebanon and contributed to the civil war, during which
Arafat and the PLO were responsible for the persecution and murder of
thousands of Lebanese citizens.
Palestinian fighters also mounted intermittent
cross-border attacks against Israel, which provoked repeated Israeli
counterattacks in an effort to prevent the Palestinians from threatening
Israelis in the north. Finally, in June 1982, Israel mounted a full-scale
assault that escalated into the Lebanon War. In September, the United
States brokered a cease-fire deal in which Arafat and his leadership
were sent to Tunisia, which became his base of operations for the next
decade.
Although a tiny minority at the time advocated
negotiations with the PLO, the vast majority of Israelis believed that
they could not negotiate with terrorists committed to their destruction.
Israeli officials held out hope that a group of moderate Palestinian
leaders would emerge in the West Bank and Gaza who would be willing to
reach an agreement. The problem was that no such leadership could emerge
because of the influence of the PLO. Anyone who cooperated with the
Israelis was considered a collaborator and in constant danger of being
killed by Arafat’s supporters.
Even though the PLO itself remained fractured,
Arafat was considered (by virtually everyone but the Israelis and
Americans) to be the spokesmen for the Palestinians inside and outside
the territories. Most countries understood this and were willing to work
with Arafat, and the Europeans, especially, pressured Israel to accept
him as a negotiating partner.
For his part, Arafat refused to express any
willingness to abandon the goal of destroying Israel or using terror to
accomplish his objective. This made it impossible for any mainstream
Israeli politician to advocate talks with Arafat (though many leftists
met with him and other PLO officials).
Exiled in Tunisia
During the 1980s, Arafat became a globe-trotter,
jet-setting from capital to capital to build diplomatic support for the
Palestinian cause. Arafat received assistance from Iraq, which allowed
him to reconstruct the badly-battered PLO. This was particularly useful
during the first uprising when, after first being surprised by the
outbreak and persistence of the violence, Arafat’s Fatah took control of
the revolt in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Arafat also continued to orchestrate international
terror activities. One of the most heinous was the hijacking of the
Achille Lauro cruise ship on October 7, 1985, during which Palestinian
terrorists shot a wheelchair-bound Jewish passenger named Leon
Klinghoffer and dumped his body overboard.
As he had in 1974, however, Arafat shifted tactics
again, this time in response to prodding from the United States. In a
December 13, 1988, address, Arafat accepted UN Security Council
Resolution 242, promised future recognition of Israel, and renounced
“terrorism in all its forms, including state terrorism.”
This statement satisfied the conditions for opening
a dialogue between the PLO and the United States. Up to this point, the
United. States. had gone along with Israeli opposition to any formal
contacts between American and PLO officials (though many informal
discussions had taken place over the years).
Arafat’s statement was supposed to reflect a shift
from one of the PLO’s primary aims — the destruction of Israel (as in
the Palestinian National Covenant) — toward the establishment of two
separate entities, an Israeli state within the 1949 armistice lines and
a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, on
April 2, 1989, Arafat was elected by the Central Council of the
Palestine National Council (the governing body of the PLO) to be the
president of the proclaimed State of Palestine, an entity which laid
claim to the whole of Palestine as defined by the British Mandate.
The PLO squandered the opportunity the United
States offered by continuing terrorist attacks. In May 1990, the
Palestine Liberation Front attacked the beaches near Tel Aviv, aiming to
raid hotels and the U.S. Embassy. This was the final straw for the Bush
Administration, which suspended its dialogue with the PLO and refocused
its attention on efforts to persuade Palestinians in the territories to
talk directly with the Israelis.
The Peace Process Begins
U.S. policymakers recognized that agreement on
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations wasn’t likely until the Arab states
took steps toward peace with Israel. It was toward this end that U.S.
Secretary of State James Baker shuttled to the Middle East in 1991 and
won agreement from Israel and her neighbors to attend a regional peace
conference.
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir had labored
to keep the PLO out of the negotiations, but he ultimately bowed to the
reality that the Palestinians in the territories were not strong enough
to make decisions and that they were forced to take directions from
Tunis. During the 1991 Madrid Conference, Israel conducted open
negotiations with the PLO for the first time.
No agreements came out of the Madrid talks and
elections brought new leaders to power in Israel and the United States.
Shortly thereafter, Israelis and PLO officials began secretly
negotiating in Oslo and ultimately reached an agreement to give the
Palestinians self-rule in Gaza and Jericho to be followed by autonomy in
other parts of the territories. Under the Oslo agreement, Israel and the
PLO recognized each other in an exchange of letters between Arafat and
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.
On September 13, 1993, the Declaration of
Principles between the Israelis and Palestinians was signed in
Washington, D.C. The following year, Arafat was awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize along with Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin.
Explaining Arafat’s Reversal
The price of Israeli recognition of the PLO
amounted to Arafat’s seemingly total capitulation to Israeli demands:
recognition of Israel, renunciation of terrorism, and a promise to
revoke the provisions of its covenant that call for the destruction of
the Jewish State. Israel’s concession was that it legitimized the PLO on
the basis of its words without first testing to see that its deeds were
consistent with them.
One important reason for Arafat’s shift was the
collapse of the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War eliminated a major
source of financial and political support for the Palestinian cause. The
PLO’s financial problems did not reach crisis proportions, however,
until the Gulf War, when Arafat’s decision to support Iraq alienated its
benefactors in the Gulf, notably Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The lack of
money put constraints on the PLO’s activities, in particular its ability
to provide benefits to Palestinians whose loyalty to the organization
was largely a result of these payoffs. In addition, Arafat came under
increasing criticism for mismanagement and corruption.
While the PLO’s resources were declining, Islamic
fundamentalists were growing in power, particularly in the Gaza Strip.
“Moderate Palestinian” leaders in the territories, such as Faisel
Husseini, also were becoming increasingly influential at Arafat’s
expense.
The intifada also had proved a failure. The
insurrection had generated tremendous publicity and tarnished Israel’s
image in 1988-89, but the Gulf crisis erased the memories of the clashes
between rock-throwing youths and Israeli soldiers. By 1992, the fiery
intifada was little more than an ember that no longer attracted media
attention or concerned Israeli decision- makers.
The most important factor in determining the timing
of Arafat’s decision was probably the change in American administrations,
which forced Arafat to give up hope that the United States would impose
his conditions on Israel. While George Bush was seen as the most
sympathetic president the Palestinians had ever dealt with, Bill Clinton
was viewed as clearly pro-Israel. This meant that the Palestinians would
have to wait at least four years and hope another Bush would come along,
but they realized this was unlikely. Thus, the American electoral cycle,
combined with his own age and waning influence, convinced Arafat that
his only chance of retaining power was to demonstrate that he could
deliver an agreement that would finally end his people’s suffering.
Oslo’s Demise
On July 1, 1994, Arafat arrived in Gaza and assumed
control over the Palestinian Authority (PA) — the provisional entity
created by the Oslo Accords. On January 20, 1996, Arafat was elected
president of the PA (he is also known by the Arabic word ra’is or “head”),
with an overwhelming 83% majority (the only other candidate was Samiha
Khalil). Though he was to serve for only three years, no other
presidential elections have ever been held.
Despite Arafat’s pledges, violence continued
throughout the end of the decade, with more than 100 Israelis being
killed and 1,000 injured in terrorist attacks. Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Barak then decided that rather than further draw out the
negotiating process with the Palestinians, he would go directly to the
end game and try to achieve a peace agreement. President Clinton agreed
with this idea and called for a summit meeting with Arafat and Barak at
Camp David on July 11-14, 2000, with the goal of hammering out the end
to the conflict.
Clinton hoped to recreate the magic of Jimmy
Carter’s successful summit that helped bring about peace between Israel
and Egypt. In that case, however, Carter had two willing partners. Anwar
Sadat had already demonstrated to Israel that he was prepared to make
peace and, when he accepted the compromises offered at Camp David,
Menachem Begin agreed to give up the Sinai. Clinton found a different
situation; Arafat had done little in the seven years since Oslo to
convince Israelis he had given up his dream of destroying Israel.
Nevertheless, Barak came prepared to offer the Palestinians independence
and offered a series of formulations to resolve the major issues. Arafat
not only rejected all of the American and Israeli ideas, he refused to
offer any of his own. As a result, Clinton blamed the summit’s failure
on Arafat.
Israel agreed to withdraw from 97% of the West
Bank, 100% of the Gaza Strip, dismantle most of the settlements, and
create a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. The only
concessions Arafat had to make were to acknowledge Israeli sovereignty
over the parts of the Western Wall religiously significant to Jews (that
is, not the entire Temple Mount), and to agree to three early warning
stations in the Jordan Valley, which Israel would withdraw from after
six years.
The Palestinian negotiators wanted to accept the
deal, but Arafat rejected it. According to the principal U.S. peace
negotiator, Dennis Ross, the critical issue was the clause in the
agreement that said the conflict would now be over. Arafat, whose life
has been governed by that conflict, Ross said, simply could not end it.
A series of horrific terror attacks were carried
out over the next several weeks — including two gunmen opening fire on a
bus stop, which killed two and wounded injured dozens more; suicide
bombings in a pedestrian mall in Jerusalem and two others in Haifa; and
a bomb and gunfire attack on a bus. After Israeli Minister of Tourism
Rehavam Ze'evi was assassinated, and more than 30 other Israelis were
murdered and several hundred were wounded, Israel’s new Prime Minister,
Ariel Sharon, declared Arafat “irrelevant” and, on December 22, 2001,
sent troops into his headquarters in Ramallah to confine him to his
office. Sharon said that Arafat would remain isolated until the killers
of Ze'evi were arrested and extradited to Israel. Arafat refused and
appealed to the international community to pressure Israel to end its
siege.
The level of violence continued to escalate while
Arafat ignored repeated warnings from the Bush Administration to take
steps to prevent attacks against Israelis. By mid-2002, President Bush
was convinced that Arafat was deeply involved in directing terror, and
concluded that the only hope for achieving progress in the peace process
was for the Palestinians to find a new leader.
Not only the Americans had soured on Arafat.
Palestinian youths became increasingly disillusioned by what they
perceived as the plodding dictatorial and corrupt nature of the PLO, and
Arafat's failure to deliver on his promise to liberate Palestine. Many
of these Palestinians turned to the Muslim fundamentalist organizations,
Islamic Jihad and Hamas, which never accepted the Oslo accords, and
remained committed to the use of terror to drive the Israelis out of all
of “Palestine.”
Arafat’s Revolving Door
Under pressure from the United States, Arafat did
periodically take steps against the violence, condemning attacks and
arresting low-level terrorists. The problem was that his condemnations
were typically in English and couched in equivocations that accused
Israel of terrorism as well. In Arabic, he would call for a jihad
against Israel and a million martyrs to liberate Jerusalem. The men he
arrested were also released after a few weeks or months, and many
subsequently committed acts of terror. Israel’s view was that Arafat
either could stop the violence and chose not to, or had no control over
militant Palestinians. In either case, they said it made no sense to
negotiate with him since the result was the same — violence.
Sharon’s view that Arafat directed the terror was
given greater credence in early January 2002, when Israeli forces
stopped a ship, the Karine-A, bound for the Palestinian Authority
carrying 50 tons of weapons from Iran that were paid for by one of
Arafat's top aides. The shipment also marked a turning point in Arafat’s
relations with President Bush, who demanded an explanation for the arms
shipment. U.S. intelligence confirmed Israel’s information that Arafat
was behind the smuggling operation, so when Arafat denied any
involvement, the President knew he was being lied to, and subsequently
would not trust Arafat.
Following a new wave of terror, Israeli tanks
rolled into the major cities of the West Bank on March 28, 2002,
surrounding them and imposing curfews in what was called “Operation
Defensive Shield.” Sharon also went beyond his earlier castigation of
Arafat as irrelevant and labeled him an enemy of Israel and surrounded
his compound with tanks.
The fact that no Arab state came to the
Palestinians’ rescue, as Arafat had expected, showed how thin the
support for the Palestinians really was in Arab capitals. Although he
once again emerged as a survivor, avoiding deportation, which Sharon
favored, and assassination, which the Palestinians feared, Arafat’s
prestige was also severely damaged.
Israel kept Arafat isolated in his Ramallah
headquarters for the next two years. During that time, Arafat continued
to rule the PA, and to receive a steady stream of foreign visitors, but
he lost his position on the world stage and was rarely seen or heard
from.
Reshuffling the Palestinian Deck
The decline in Arafat’s popularity was reinforced
by Israel’s refusal to negotiate with him and the United States’
insistence that the Palestinian Authority institute reforms. In
response, Arafat reshuffled his cabinet and promised to hold new
elections. Arafat’s actions were still being viewed both by Palestinians
and others as suspect because the cabinet changes did not reflect any
meaningful shift in power.
On June 24, 2002, Bush laid out a plan that called
on the Palestinians to replace Arafat as their leader, reform the
governmental institutions of the Palestinian Authority, end terrorism,
and adopt democratic and free-market principles. The President agreed
with the Israeli view that Arafat had to be replaced, and that terrorism
had to end, before they were required to act.
The Palestinians were angry and felt betrayed. They
did not believe the United States had the right to tell them who their
leader should be, and continued to insist that Israel had to withdraw
from all the territories before they would end their violent struggle.
Despite the Palestinians’ response, the Bush plan
stimulated changes in the Palestinian Authority. Desperate to hold onto
power, Arafat offered a reform plan and a timetable for new elections.
Palestinians who had been cowed into silence by Arafat’s unquestioned
authority for the first time began to speak out about the Palestinian
Authority’s corruption and the need for changes.
Under international pressure, Arafat subsequently
appointed Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to be the Prime Minister of the
Palestinian Authority. The United States had hoped Abbas would become
the authority of the PA and Arafat would be reduced to a figurehead.
Arafat saw things just the reverse and maintained authority over all the
main levers of power, in particular the security services. In
frustration, Abbas resigned and was replaced by Ahmed Korei (Abu Alaa),
who had no more success than Abbas in wresting control of the PA from
Arafat.
Arafat’s Source of Power
In addition to being a symbol of the Palestinian
national movement, Arafat also derived much of his influence by
controlling a vast financial empire first established by the PLO through
its criminal activities and later augmented by hundreds of millions of
dollars siphoned from donations by the international community to the
Palestinian Authority. Rather than use these resources to live the kind
of luxurious lifestyle typified by other Arab despots, Arafat has used
his money primarily to buy loyalty.
In 2003, a team of American accountants hired by
the PA finance ministry began examining Arafat’s finances. The team
determined that part of the Palestinian leader’s wealth was in a secret
portfolio worth close to $1 billion — with investments in companies like
a Coca-Cola bottling plant in Ramallah, a Tunisian cell phone company
and venture capital funds in the U.S. and the Cayman Islands. The head
of the investigation stated that “although the money for the portfolio
came from public funds like Palestinian taxes, virtually none of it was
used for the Palestinian people; it was all controlled by Arafat. And
none of these dealings were made public.”
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) conducted an
audit of the Palestinian Authority and discovered that Arafat diverted
$900 million in public funds to a special bank account controlled by
Arafat and the PA Chief Economic Financial Advisor. It was, therefore,
not surprising when Forbes ranked Arafat sixth on its 2003 list of
“Kings, Queens and Despots,” estimating his personal wealth at a minimum
of $300 million.
Arafat’s wife Suha reportedly receives a stipend of
$100,000 each month from the PA budget. In October 2003, the French
government opened a money-laundering probe of Suha after prosecutors
learned about regular transfers of nearly $1.27 million from Switzerland
to Mrs. Arafat’s accounts in Paris.
Arafat’s Final Days
In 1990, Arafat, a Sunni Muslim, married Suha Tawil,
a Palestinian Greek Orthodox Christian who converted to Islam before
marrying him. At the time, Arafat was 62 and Suha 28. Suha's mother, a
Palestinian activist and writer, introduced Arafat to her daughter, who
was then studying at the Sorbonne. Arafat subsequently hired Suha to
work on his personal staff in Tunis. In July 1995, the couple had a
daughter Zawha, named after Arafat’s deceased mother. After the start of
the second uprising, Suha moved to live with her mother and daughter in
Paris.
Arafat survived several assassination attempts over
the years, as well as a plane crash in a sandstorm in the Libyan desert
on April 7, 1992. For the last several years of his life he was in
failing health and rumored to have Parkinson's Disease. His conditioned
worsened in October 2004. Israel agreed to allow him to be transferred
to a hospital in Paris on October 29 where his wife stayed by his side.
He died November 11, 2004, at age 75.
The cause of death was never announced, and remains
a mystery. Conspiratorial suggestions that Israel was somehow involved
were quickly rejected by Palestinian authorities. Rumors have circulated
for decades that Arafat was gay, and much of the speculation about his
death, and the associated secrecy of the circumstances, have led to
suggestions that he may have died of AIDS.
After his death, Arafat’s body was flown from Paris
to Cairo, where a ceremony was held in his honor attended by numerous
foreign dignitaries. Arafat’s remains were then flown to Ramallah where
he was interred in a grave near his headquarters. The Palestinians had
wanted to bury Arafat in Jerusalem, but the Israelis objected. In the
short-run, the Palestinians plan to make Arafat’s grave a shrine, but
they have expressed the intention of moving his body to Jerusalem after
achieving independence and establishing a capital in some part of the
holy city.
For nearly half a century Arafat was the symbol of
Palestinian nationalism. Though he was not a military man, he was rarely
seen out of his uniform in an effort to project strength and his
commitment to armed struggle. He wore his kaffiyeh in a unique fashion,
draped over his shoulder in the shape of Palestine, that is, all of
historic Palestine, including Israel. The high-profile terrorist attacks
he directed helped gain international attention and sympathy for the
Palestinian cause, but, ultimately, his unwillingness to make the
psychological leap from terrorist mastermind to statesman prevented him
from achieving independence for the Palestinian people, and brought them
decades of suffering that could have been avoided had he abandoned his
revolutionary zeal for liberating Palestine and agreed to live in peace
with Israel.
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